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NOTES
NoN-DIsCLOSURE OF PRINCIPAL AS A DEFENSE TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANE-Under what circumstances will a failure by an agent
to disclose the identity of his principal constitute such a defense as
to preclude the principal from obtaining specific performance of a
contract made in his behalf ? The appearance of two recent cases 1
which seem to reach conflicting conclusions on this question warrant
an examination into the legal principles by which an undisclosed principal obtains rights against a vendee, and the equitable, principles by
which he may specifically enforce those rights.
In the English case, Dyster v. Randall & Sons, the principal, P,
knowing that T, the owner of several plots of ground, would refuse
to deal with him, employed an agent, A, to make the purchase, the
transaction being completed without disclosing the agency relationship. P, as undisclosed principal, now sues T for specific performance of the contract. The court, in sustaining P's bill, remarked:
"In the present case no personal qualification possessed by A
formed a material ingredient; it was a contract which the defendants would have entered into with any other person; and it
was a contract the benefit of which was assignable; and, further,
the agent was himself liable to the defendant as principal. There
was no direct misrepresentation. The mere non-disclosure as
to the person actually entitled to the benefit of the contract for
the sale of real estate did not amount to misrepresentation, even
though the contracting agent knew that, if the disclosures were
made, the. other contracting party would not enter into the contract."
The case of Gwin v. Tusa, decided in Louisiana, presents substantially the same problem. T, an illiterate Italian, refused to sell
his land to P, whereupon P employed A, a real estate broker, who
Dyster v. Randall & Sons, [1926] Ch. D. 932; Gwin v. Tusa, III So. 339
(La. 1927).
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had previously acted as T's agent, to purchase the land from T. A
secured T's signature to an unsigned bill of sale, upon which P sued
for specific performance. The court denied specific performance
against the vendor, T, reasoning that
"it was plainly the duty of plaintiff's agent to have so advised
defendant before obtaining his signature. The concealment by
plaintiff's agent of the fact that plaintiff was the intended purchaser was sufficient therefore, in the case at bar, to vitiate the
contract for want of consent on the part of defendant."
These two views present a precise problem in agency law which

has seldom received judicial consideration, and which depends for
its solution upon the application of the law of undisclosed principal.
It is therefore necessary to determine, first, as a matter of pure legal
theory, whether an undisclosed principal is precluded from obtaining rights under a contract which would not have been consummated
bad the fact of. agency been known; and secondly, having established
a legal relation, to determine under what circumstances equitable
remedy will be refused. The problem will be considerd first as it
would arise in a court of law.
It is undisputed law that an undisclosed principal may both sue
and be sued upon a contract made in his behalf by an agent.2 Although many reasons have been assigned in support of this rule,3
there is no fundamental common law basis upon which it rests, for a
third party was never mutually contemplated, in the making of the
contract, as one of the parties to it. The doctrine, therefore is but
another anomaly in the law which is so well supported by authority
that it has become axiomatic.4 There are certain situations, however,
where the undisclosed principal cannot sue upon the contract: (I)
Where there is a sealed contract; 1 (2) where there is a negotiable
instrument; 1 (3) where the contract involves elements of personal
'HuFFcuT, AGENCY (2d ed. igo.) § i2o: "The case escapes the common
law doctrine and establishes the sweeping rule that an undisclosed principal may
both sue and be sued upon a contract made in his behalf. It is a general rule,
that whenever an express contract is made, an action is maintainable upon it,
either in the name of the person with whom it is actually made, or in the name
of the person with whom, in point of law, it was made. Whatever the true
grounds of this doctrine, it is at all events conceded that the one case in which
a person not a party to a contract may unquestionably sue and also be sued is
the case of the undisclosed principal." MECHEM, AGE'NCY (2d ed. 1914) § 2059;
TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) § 96.
'See discussion, 5 BOSTON U. L. REv. (1925) 187 et seq. Some of the
reasons assigned are: (i) To prevent circuity of action in compelling the principal to sue the agent and the agent then to sue the vendor; (2) Mutuality
demands that the principal have rights of enforcement equal to those of the
vendor; (3) The situation is analogous to the law of assignment.
'Authorities cited supra note 2.
6MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2064.
See also 2 TEx. L. Rav. 379
(1924) for peculiar Texas case.
'MECHEM, op. cit. supra, § 2o65.
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trust and confidence; or where misrepresentation, fraud, or other
defenses are available against the agent.8 It is quite apparent that only
the two latter situations need be considered in connection with the
present problem. The undisclosed principal, as has been established,
is legally entitled to sue upon a contract unless some valid defense
is interposed. Our particular problem, in an action at law, reduces
itself to the sole question, is mere non-disclosure of the principal's
identity such a defense as to render the contract unenforceable, conceding that the agent knew that the vendor would not deal with
the principal, at the time the contract was effected?
The decisions of the courts in treating this problem are apparently in irreconcilable discord, but an examination of the subject indicates that the cases are divisible into three groups. The first group
is concerned with situations involving personal trust and confidence
as an integral part of the contract. It is manifest. that a contract of
this type cannot be enforced by or against an individual not contemplated by the parties, for no one but those contracting can fulfill the qualifications demanded by the agreement. It therefore follows that an undisclosed principal has no rights nor liabilities in a
contract respecting the granting of exclusive credit to the agent, 9
a contract in which the third party has expressly refused to negotiate
with anyone but the party signing,' 0 and a contract by which the
agent has bound himself to execute a warranty deed. 1 The test applied by the majority of courts to determine whether a contract includes elements of personal trust ard confidence seems to be: Would
the contract be enforceable by the principal were he the assignee?
The second classification pertains to cases where the agent, in
dealing with the third party, has been guilty of fraud or misrepresentation. Where the elements of fraud and misrepresentation are
proved as factors inducing the third party to negotiate, the resulting
contract becomes voidable at the option of the third party, and no
rights accrue to or vest in the principal. 12 Fraud has always been a
MECHEm, op. cit. supra, § 2o67. Some courts depart fallaciously from the
agency view by interpreting the contract according to strict contract law, saying,
"Every man has a right to elect what parties he will deal with. You have a
right to the benefit you contemplate from the character, credit and substance of
the person with whom you contract." Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303
(i867). It is submitted that the better method is to treat the problem as a contract involving personal trust and confidence, if such elements are present.
'TInFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 98; MECHEM, op. cit. supra, § 2074.
"Coast Fisheries Co. v. Linen Thread Co., 269 Fed. 841 (D. C. Mass.
192I); Cowan v. Curran, 2x6 I1. 598, 75 N. E. 322 (19o5).
"Moore v. Vulcanite Cement Co., 121 N. Y. App. Div. 667, lo6 N. Y.
Supp. 393 (1907). Semble: Brown v. Morris, 83 N. C. 251 (i88o).
'Birmingham Matinee Club v. McCarty, 15:2 Ala. 571, 44 So. 642 (1907).
"Phillips v. Duke of Buckingham, i Vern. 227 (1683) ; Humble v. Hunter,
12 Q. B. 315 (1848); Archer v. Stone, 78 L. T. R. (w. s.) 34 (1898); Fox. v.
Tabel, 66 Conn. 398, 34 Atl. ioi (i895) : "Fraud in procuring a contract can
always be shown in defense to a suit upon it. No man can maintain an action
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valid defense to a contract, and it is submitted that the courts, in sustaining this defense, are merely applying established contract law
without modifying, in any way, the law of undisclosed principal. The
confusion in the decisions arises solely upon the interpretation by the
courts as to what constitutes fraud and misrepresentation.
The third and final category includes cases where the agent had
merely failed to disclose tht he is acting in a representative capacity.
Naturally, the situation could only present a problem if we assume
that the personal equation was not an element in the contract, and
there was no active representation that he was the only party interested. In other words, what effect does a failure by an agent to disclose voluntarily his representative capacity have upon the principal's
rights? Bearing in mind the fundamental concept and theory of the
law of undisclosed principal, namely, that one not contemplated as
a party to a contract may become a legally recognized party, the answer to the question is patently, no. By definition alone, the theory
precludes the idea that mere failure to disclose the relationship is a
defense, for the theory itself depends upon the assumption that there
is no duty to disclose. It must logically follow, therefore, that the
fact that the agent while negotiating knew of the hostility of the third
party for his principal would also be immaterial. Cardozo, J., when
3
confronted with the problem,' reasoned:
"If Booth [the agent] had given the order in his own right
for his own benefit, but with the expectation of later assigning
it to the plaintiff, that undisclosed expectation would not have
nullified the contract. His undisclosed intention to act for a
principal who was unknown to the defendant was equally ineffective to destroy the contract in its inception. If, therefore,
the contract did not fail for want of parties to sustain it, the unsuspected existence of an undisclosed principal can supply no
ground for the avoidance of a contract unless fraud is proved.
We are asked to hold that a contract complete in form, becomes a
nullity in fact because of a secret belief in the mind of the undisclosed principal that the disclosure of his name would be prejudicial to the completion of the bargin. We cannot go so far."
This lucid and logical analysis of the problem is submitted as
the correct solution. There being, then, no duty to disclose a relationship of agency, it must be acknowledged that a mere failure so to disupon an agreement which was confessedly procured by his assertion that he was
authorized by another to execute it in his behalf, when such representations
were false and made with intent to deceive and defraud the other contracting
party." See also Winchester v. Howard, supra note 7; Brown v. Pitcairn, 148
Pa. 387, 24 AtI. 352 (1892).

Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Paving Co., 211 N. Y. 68, 1O5 N. E.
88 (1914). (P, believing T would not sell to him, employed A to purchase in
A's name, and then sued upon the contract for a breach and recovered.)

NOTES

close is no fraud or misrepresentation.'

4

The courts generally have

responded to the validity of this conclusion, but have been peculiarly
vague and ambiguous in exposing the intricacies of legal reasoning
by which they reached their conclusion.'"
The confusion found in this branch of the law arises in the application of the rules governing the three foregoing classes of cases to
the facts of each particular case. The reports display innumerable
conflicts as to what constitutes a contract involving personal trust
and confidence, and the essential elements of fraud and misrepresentation. To illustrate, the court deciding the Gwin case 18 said:
"The concealment by plaintiff's agent of the fact that plaintiff was the intended purchaser was sufficient therefore, in the
case at bar., to vitiate the contract for want of consent on the
part of defendant."
It is unnecessary to say that the learned court assumed a duty
to disclose the agency, and failed to consider the established rules
and concepts regarding the law of undisclosed principals. The crux
of the entire problem seems to lie in the realization that an undisclosed principal has an incontrovertible right of action upon a contract made for his benefit, subject only to the defense that the contract is one involving personal trust and confidence, or one induced
by fraud or misrepresentation. It is probably expedient to remark
that both these defenses have no influence upon the law of undisclosed principal, nor are confined exclusively to it, but are available
against all contracts.
When thus considered as an abstract legal proposition, irrespective of the field of equity, it necessarily follows that the opinion advanced in the Dyster case is the only proper and logical decision. To
apply the doctrine sponsored by the Gwin case in a court of law,
without regard to the equitable factors, would result in the abrogation of the law of undisclosed principal in its entirety. It must therefore be concluded that a mere non-disclosure by an agent that he acts
for a principal can have no effect, in the eyes of the law, upon the
4

LEAxE, CONTRACrS (7th ed. 1921) 244: "Mere non-disclosure, apart from
circumstances importing a duty of informing the other party or rendering the
fact material for him to know, is not sufficient ground for avoiding a contract"
KERR, FRAuD (5th ed. i92o) 68: "Concealment to be material must be
concealment of something that the party concealing was under some legal or
equitable obligatioii to disclose."
15
Lenmnan v. Jones, 2= U. S. 5I (Igi1); Rice & Bullen Malting Co. v.
International Bank, 86 Ill. App. 136 (1899) ; Davidson v. Hurty, ii6 Minn. 28o,
133 N. W. 862 (191) ; Kelly v. Thuey, 143 Mo. 422, 45 S. W. '300 (1898) ;
Brown v. Morris, supra note io; Standard Steel Car Co. v. Stamm, 207 Pa.
419, 55 Adt. 954 (904) ; Cole v. Hunter Tract Co., 6i Wash. 365, 112 Pac. 368
(igio). See also Hawkins v. Windhorat, 87 Kan. 176, 123 Pac. 761 (1912),
where the court decided that the undisclosed principal could enforce performance
unless it was shown that ownership by the agent was material.
" Supra note i.
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principal's rights created by the contract. The inception, basis and
continued application of the law of undisclosed principal prohibits a
contrary determination.
Assuming, now, that a perfect legal obligation has been made out
between the undisclosed principal and the vendee, there still remains
the problem of remedy in equity. Under the early conception of
equity, the remedy of specific performance, like all equitable relief,
was an extraordinary and supplementary remedy, which the chancellor could give or withhold as his conscience dictated. 17 But as
equity jurisdiction grew, and specific performance became frequent
and usual, the tests by which a chancellor would refuse to give the
remedy became classified and somewhat crystallized, so that under
proper conditions the remedy was said to be given more "as a matter of right" rather than as a matter of grace.18 The exact status of
the remedy at the present day has engaged many juristic thinkers
and philosophers. One thing seems certain, the right is not absolute
and indefeasible like the right to recover legal judgment. On the
other hand, it is abundantly settled that the remedy is not discretionary in the usual conception of the word. Reduced to a guide
rather than to a working principle, the matter may be said, in essence,
to be this: given a valid contract, then, if all the conditions, circumstances and incidents which equity regards as essential are present, 9
the right to specific performance is perfect and the bill must be given.
Whether these equitable requirements are fulfilled or not depends,
in the final analysis, upon the attitude of the court before whom a
bill has come. The criterion of some courts is "fairness"-they will
specifically enforce only those contracts which to their minds seem
fair. In other courts, the aim is only to prevent unconscionable or
fraudulent contracts. In between, there are courts with lesser and
greater ambitions to attain so-called "justice." 20
' CLARK, EQUITY (1919)

OPHY OF LAw (922)

§ 42;

POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOS-

130.

" Haywood v. Cope, 25 Beav. i4o (1858), where at page 50 Lord Romilly,
M. R., fully discusses the nature of the discretion in specific performance;
Holiday v. Lockwood, [1917] 2 Ch. 45 at 56; WATERMAN, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (i88I) § 6: "Courts of equity do not sit, any more than courts of law, to
distribute favors or acts of grace to their suitors; their judicial function consists in the protection of rights and the enforcement of duties by means of remedies which they administer . . . Where all the proper conditions are present,
the remedial right is as perfect, certain, and absolute as the nature of the remedy
itself will permit." And see POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1926)
§46.
. PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note I8, § 38, lists these conditions, circumstances
and incidents as follows: "The contract must be certain, unambiguous, mutual,
and upon a valuable consideration; it must be perfectly fair in all its parts;
free from any misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake, imposition or surprise; not
an unconscionable or hard bargain; finally, it must be capable of specific execution through a decree of the court."
"POMEROY, op. cit. supra, § 40; BIsPHAm, EQUITY (1915) § 371; 30 W. VA.
L. REV. 293, Note (1924).

NOTES

Non-disclosure of principal has not been handled by some courts

of equity with exactly the same analysis accorded the concealment of
any other fact in the making of the contract. On principle this is incorrect. Action by an agent for an undisclosed principal is an operative fact which in law will create contractual rights in that principal."Failure to disclose the name 'of the principal in a court of eqtdty
should therefore have no different effect in preventing a remedy than
failure to disclose any other relevant fact. If the fact concealed is
material so that there is an equitable duty (as contradistinguished
from a legal duty) to disclose, the contract will not be specifically enforced against the party misled, even though there is not sufficient
fraud to make the contract voidable in law. 22 The difficulty in applying any doctrine of equitable duty to disclose is to determine when
such an equitable duty-duty in the juridicial sense of that termrests upon the agent who is negotiating the business. Ordinarily an
agent cannot occupy a fiduciary relationship with regard to the third
party with whom he is dealing, 23 so that an equitable duty, if there
be one, must precipitate from the circumstances in which the agent
and third party find themselves. Just what the circumstances are
in which such a duty is made out cannot be reduced to sets of rules.
All the cases can be classified in three groups. In one group a bill
is never refused on account of non-disclosure; in the second the bill
is always refused on account of non-disclosure; in the third the outcome cannot be prophesied.
I. The agent is not aware of the unwillingness of the defendant
to deal with his principal. After the contract is complete, and the
identity of the principal is revealed, the defendant objects to the race,
religion, personality, political affiliations, genealogy, sex, or character,
of the principal. In such cases if the legal obligation is unimpeachable, no court will refuse a bill in2 equity because of the obnoxiousness
of the plaintiff to the defendant. '

In the leading case of Cole v. Hunter Tract Development Co., 25
A, acting for P, entered into an agreement for the purchase of one
of T's lots in a large land development. T refused to sell to negroes
' It is conceived that the analysis is the same whether the enforceable right
be called a contract right or a property right. See discussion in CLARK, op. cit.
supra, § 83 and notes.
" Cf. cases cited supra note 12.
'See cases cited in PomEaoy, op. cit. supra, § 184, note a; Kelleher v,
Bragg, 96 N. J. Eq. 25, 124 Atl. 530 (1924).
" Lenman v. Jones, 222 U. S. 51 (191) ; Cole'v. Hunter Tract, Development
Co., 61 Wash. 365, i2 Pac. 368 (i9IO) ; notes on related topic are in 32 L. R A.
(N. S.) 125, ANN. CAS. 191:2C 75o. Cf. New York Brokerage Co. v. Wharton,
I43 Iowa 6r, 11g N. W. 969 (igog) (semble, that no bill is enforced unless the
third party is aware that the contracting -party is an agent for some undisclosed
principal).
'Supra note 24.
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but A was not aware of this fact. P, a negro, was granted a decree
for specific performance. The court analyzed the problem thus:
.
. .it is the same in effect as if both [were] ignormistaken as to the real market value of the lot. If
and
of
ant
there is any difference here as to the obligation resting upon the
respective parties to. inform themselves as to the facts which
would induce appellant not to make the sale, it would seem more
just to require respondent to inform himself as to appellant's
desire not to sell to negroes."
This group of cases represents one extremity. A perfect legal
right is made out and the equities may be illusory and exist only in the
mind of the defendant. The courts therefore take no cognizance of
them. There is neither an element of unclean hands, or of hardship
on the defendant upon which an equitable defense may be bottomed.
II. The agent perceives that the defendant will not contract with
his principal. The contract when complete, if specifically enforced
would result in pecuniary loss, prejudice or hardship to the defendant. The courts consistently refuse to give equitable relief in cases
of this kind. 28 The problem most frequently arises where one business competitor seeks to gain some advantage over his rival by purchasing some of his rival's property. In a typical case, Cohn v.
Knabb,27 P was a neighbor and competitor in business of T. A, representing himself as principal, contracted to purchase the business
stock and fixtures of T. The court refused to grant P specific performance of the contract consummated by his agent's efforts, on the
ground that the court would be licensing P to participate in the invoicing-this might work an interference with T's business.
In cases in this group the courts intermingle the doctrine of
unclean hands with that of hardship so that it is difficult to tell which
predominates in the courts' mind. The doctrine of unclean hands
would look primarily to the nature of the act of the agent-his culpability. The doctrine of hardship would look to the effect of the decree on the defendant-his unwarranted loss. Whatever the doctrine
upon which it is reasoned this group of cases furnishes the other extremity in which all courts will refuse to allow specific performance.
III. No hardship or pecuniary loss can result to the defendant
(unless mental disquiet be called hardship). There has been a previous refusal to contract with the principal, and the agent is aware
of the animosity between plaintiff and defendant. There is no unanimity of opinion as to whether a duty to disclose devolves upon the
'Ellsworth v. Randall, 78 Iowa 141, 42 N. W. 629 (189o) (tax title not
in purchaser as made to appear) ; Miller v. Fulmer, 25 Pa. Super. io6 (1909);
Cohn v. Knabb, 105 Wash. 363, 177 Pac. 794 (91).
'Supra note 26.

NOTES

agent in cases of this kind.2 8 Here manifestly the only doctrine on
which the courts of equity can refuse the bill is the unclean hands
of the contracting agent.
The Dyster case and the Gwin case fall somewhere within this
fuliginous group. The Dyster case was decided on the legal obligation entirely-that is, having a perfected legal right, the equitable
remedy followed as a matter of certainty. 29 The court that decided
the Gwin case seemed so carried away by what they thought was unethical dealing3 0 on the part of the plaintiff that they found-and
wrongly it is submitted-no legal relationship between the two. It
would appear that had they found a legal contract, they would have
refused the equitable remedy notwithstanding. The gist of this conflict is a difference in point of view as to the functions of equity
courts.
Unclean hands is at best a vague term.31 How iniquitous the
conduct of a plaintiff or agent must be is never clearly indicated. The
line of demarcation between the clean and unclean hands in the decided cases is as imperceptible as the line of the horizon on a misty
evening. Borderline cases always depend on the experience, background and discernment of the deciding judge.
. As a matter of law there is no duty to disclose in cases coming
within this last group. As a matter of equity, it is submitted, there
should be no duty. The only basis upon which such an equitable
duty could be rested is the unclean hands of the plaintiff, and this
uncleailiness in turn depends on the known hostility which the defendant maintains toward the plaintiff. The right to an attitude

"Smith v. Wheatcoft, 9 Ch. D. 223 (878) (no duty); Drummond v.
Shiver, 114 Md. 643, 8o At. 217 (i911) (semble, duty); Suss v. Anderson, I59
Mo. App. 656, 139 S. W. 1178 (i911) (duty); FRY, SPEclFic PEREoRmAwcE
(6th ed. 1921) § 229, and cases there cited. For non-disclosure of other relevant
facts see Bowles v. Round, 5 Ves. Jr. 508 (i8oo), i AmEs, CASES, EQurry, 362,
and notes.
"This seems to be the law in England. In a note to the Dyster case in 70 SOL.
J. 789 (1926), this passage appears: "The present position of the law applicable
to such cases as these is as follows: If in negotiations for a contract an agent
makes a false representation (e. g. in reply to a question 'Are you buying for X
or his nominee?'), as to the name of his principal knowing that, if he disclosed
the true name the other party would not enter into the contract, the court will

order specific performance of the contract; [citing Archer v. Stone, supra note
12]. If an agent merely fails to disclose the identity of the person entitled to

the benefit of the contract this will not disentitle the principal to a decree bf
specific performance."

The court mentions the following factors, in the opinion: the defendant
had confidence in the agent; the defendant was an uneducated Italian; the
defendant although solicited had refused to sell the property in question to the
plaintiff; the agreement did not contain the name of the vendee when it was
signed. The court concludes: "It was plainly the duty of the plaintiff's agent
to have so advised defendant [as to the identity of the purchaser] before obtaining his signature." Sed quirre?
.Some aspects of this maxim are to be found in 8 COLUMBIA L. REV. 40,
Note (igo8).
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which may be the result of personal idiosyncracy or emotional reaction is not a legally or equitably protected right. No exception should
be made by refusing to an undisclosed principal the aid of equity
in enforcing his legal rights. The correct test to apply is this-is
some recognized right of the defendant being abrogated by granting
the decree. Maintaining this view does not remove the discretion of
the chancellor which Dean Pound has called a "an important engine
of justice . . . a needed safety valve in the working of our legal
system." It merely limits it. Any rational limitation of discretion
assists in the attainment of the much-exalted "knowne certaintie of
the law."

I. C.
G.M.
Is THE ADDRESSEE OF A TELEGRAM BOUND BY A STIPULATION

LIMITING TIME FOR PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS?-The business of
telegraphy in the United States, from its earliest development, has
been characterized as a public employment. Both the courts and the
legislatures have, by decision and statute, impressed upon the business
the essential features of a public calling. With a view to limiting
their common law liabilities, telegraph companies have incorporated
into their printed blank forms various stipulations among which is a
provision exempting the company from any damages unless a written
claim is presented within a specified time. In a recent Texas case 1
the question arose whether an addressee of a telegram is bound by

such a provision.
It is generally held that the stipulations on the back of an ordinary telegraph blank are valid when reasonable. 2 And this is so
whether the stipulations are looked upon as regulations of the company or as a part of the contract between the sender and the company.
If the stipulations are considered to be regulations, the assent of the
sender is not necessary. The only requisite is that they come to the
2 POUND,
1

op. cit. supra note 17, 132.

West. U. Tel. Co. v. Vann, 288 S. W. 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
West. U. Tel. Co. v. Dunfield, ii Colo. 335, I8 Pac. 34 (888) ; West. U.
Tel. Co. v. Waxelbaum, 113 Ga. 1017, 395 S. E. 443 (I9OI) ; Webbe v. West.
U. Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 6IO, 48 N. E. 67o (1897); Russel v. West. U. Tel. Co.,
57 Kan. 230, 45 Pac. 598 (1896); Wheelock v. Postal Tel. Co., 197 Mass.
11, 83 N. E. 313 (907); Young v. West. U. Tel. Co., 65 N. Y. App. 163
(1875); Wolfe v. West. U. Tel. Co., 62 Pa. 83 (1869); Aiken v. West. U.
Tel. Co., 5 S. C. 358 (x874). Contra: Davis v. West. U. Tel. Co., IO7 Ky.
527, 54 S. W. 849 (19oo); West. U. Tel. Co. v. Kemp, 44 Neb. 194, 62 N. W.
451 (1895). These provisions -re not in the nature of a private statute of
limitations for it only requires a claim to be presented; the action may be
brought at any time within the statute of limitations: Sykes v. West. U. Tel.
Co., 15o N. C. 431, 64 S. E. 177 (19o9); Kirby v. West. U. Tel. Co., 75 S.
Dak. 623, 6s N. W. 37 (1895).
Contra: West. U. Tel. Co. v. Longwill, 5
N. Mex. 308 (1889).
2

NOTES

knowledge of the person sending the message--and it has been held
that the printing of the rules and regulations on the back of the blank
brings them to the knowledge of the sender who uses the forms.3 If,
however, the stipulations are treated as part of the contract, the assent
of the sender is required; and by writing the message on the printed
blank he is deemed to have assented to the special provisions therein,
and is bound by them.4
The provision limiting the time for the presentation of claims is
one commonly inserted. The ordinary form reads: "The company
will not be liable in damages in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within 6o days after the cause of action has accrued."
The purpose of*the stipulation is to bring all claims to the attention of
the telegraph company within a short time after the alleged wrong has
been committed; so that they may have the necessary evidence on hand
to rebut the charges. If the actions were not brought within a reasonably short time the company would inevitably lose control of the
pertinent facts; they would be beyond recollection. The courts have
recognized the necessity for this and for other stipulations and almost
unanimously have held them valid and binding, at least upon the
sender.5 They must, of course, be reasonable. 6
Assuming then, that the sender is bound by the stipulations on
the blank, a more difficult problem arises in considering their effect on
the rights of the addressee of the message.'
'Bartlett v. West'U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209 (1873); Birney v. N. Y. &
Wash. Printing Tel. Co., I8 Md. 341 (1862); West U. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15
Mich. 526 (1867); Cole v. West U. Tel. Co., 57 Wis. 562, 16 N. W. 32 (1883).
'West. U. Tel. Co. v. Prevatt, 149 Ala. 617, 43 So. io6 (1907); Hill
v. West. U. Tel. Co., 85 Ga. 425, 1i S. E. 874 (I8go); Grinnell v. West. U.
Tel., 113 Mass. 299 (1873); Jacob v. West U. Tel. Co., I35 Mich. 6oo, 98
N. W. 402 (904); Kiley v. West. U. Tel. Co., iop N. Y. 231, 16 N. E. 75
(1888) ; Wolfe v. West U. Tel. Co., supra note 2. In Illinois assent will not
be presumed by the mere signing. It must be shown that the plaintiff saw
it on the blank, or knew of it and assented to it; and whether he had knowledge of and assented to the stipulation is a matter of fact for the jury to
determine: West. U. Tel. Co. v. Fairbanks, 15 Ill. App. 6oo (i884).

Supra note

2.

'Reasonable time is generally a question for the court. Sixty days is the
usual time and it has been upheld as reasonable. Twenty days has been held
to be reasonable. Aiken v. West. U. Tel. Co., supra note 2; Heiman v. West.
U. Tel. Co., supra note 3. Where, however, it was shown that the plaintiff
without fault did not become aware of his cause of action until either the whole
time elapsed, or the time that remained was not fairly sufficient for the purpose, the stipulatiQn was held to be unreasonable under the circumstances and
therefore not binding: Sherril v. West U. Tel. Co., iop N. C. 527, 14 S. E.
94 (i891); Conrad v. West U. Tel. Co., 162 Pa. 204, 29 Atl. 888 (1894)
(cable message from Philadelphia to Shanghai where defendant's neglect could
not have been ascertained in the ordinary course of business within sixty days.)
If the facts are not undisputed or if they are capable of a varied construction
the matter of reasonable time may be left to the jury: West. U. Tel. Co. v.
Phillips, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 613 (1893).
'It seems from the adjudicated cases that whether the stipulations are
considered regulations or terms of the contract does not materially affect the
addressee. See infra notes 17 and i9.
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The addressee is generally conceded to have a right of action
against the telegraph company for its errors in transmitting or failure
to deliver a message." But the theories allowing recovery vary, with
the consequence that the question whether the addressee is bound by
the stipulations on the back of the blank is not uniformly answered by
the courts.
In the principal case, 9 .where the stipulation provided that a claim
for damages had to be presented in writing within ninety-five days
after the cause of action accrued, and the addressee took no definite
action until after the lapse of that period, recovery was denied. The
court treated the stipulation as a term of the contract and held the
addressee bound by the terms of it just as the sender was. The
opinion does not indicate what theory was adopted.
If the sender of the message is actually the agent of the addressee
or sends the message upon the latter's request, the addressee, as
undisclosed principal, may maintain an action on the contract against
the company for their errors or failure to deliver." ° In this situation
because of the privity of contract between the addressee and the company, the former is bound by the stipulations."
Some courts in an
endeavor to allow the addressee a right of action upon the contract
will even construct an agency where the message is for the benefit of
the addressee. In this situation the addressee may maintain an action
upon the contract 12 as "principal," and it follows that he is bound by
its stipulations. It is obvious that there is in fact no agency. The
relationship of principal and agent is the result of mutual assent, and
to say that one may become an agent of the addressee by voluntarily
sending him a message for his benefit is to state a fiction. Some
courts instead of raising a fiction of agency allow an addressee to sue
as third party beneficiary on the contract between the sender and the
company. 18 The message must disclose on its face, or by the circumstances in which it is sent, that it is for the benefit of the addressee.
Consequently, the addressee is held to the terms of the contract between the other two parties and the stipulations are binding upon him.
It is thus seen that if the addressee's suit against the company is on
' See 37 Cyc.

1717; 26 R. C. L. 586; 2 JoYcE, EI.Ecric LAW (i907) 1499;
(i895)
409; 51 U. OF PA. L. REv. 715 (903).
'Supra note i.
'West. U. Tel. Co. v. Cunningham, 99 Ala. 314, 14 So. 579 (1892); Pennington v. West. U. Tel. Co., 67 Ia. 631 (i885); Milliken v. West. U. Tel.
Co., o N. Y. 403, 18 N. E. 251 (1888) ; De Rutte v. N. Y. Electric Magnetic
Tel. Co., i Daly 547 (N. Y. 1866).
' Coit v. West. U. Tel. Co., 130 Colo. 657, 63 Pac. 83 (19oo) ; West v.
West. U. Tel. Co., 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. 807 (1888); Halstead v. Postal Tel.
Co., 193 N. Y. 293, 85 N. E. io78 (i9o8).
"Sherril v. West. U. Tel. Co., 1o9 N. C. 527 (1891); West. U. Tel.
Co. v. Broesche, 72 Tex. 654 (1888).
u West. U. Tel. Co. v. Woodard, 84 Ark. 323, 105 S. W. 579 (1907);
West. U. Tel. Co. v. Hope, ii Ill. App. 259 (1882) ; Chapman v. West. U.
Tel. Co., go Ky. 265, 136 S. W. 88o (889o) ; Aiken v. West. U. Tel. Co., supra
CRoswELL, ELacrrIy

note 2.

NOTES

the contract between the latter and the sender, the addressee is bound
by its terms, and must bring his action or present his claim " within
the stipulated time, or he will not be allowed a recovery.
Where no contractual action can be made out, the American
courts generally allow the addressee to maintain an action in tort for
negligence in transmission or failure to deliver a message. 15 When
the action is ex delicto, there is confusion in the decisions of the
courts, as to whether the addressee is bound by the stipulation in
question. The divergence exists because the courts differ upon the
basis of the addressee's right of action. That there must be a duty
owed and a breach of that duty is obvious. Some courts express the
opinion that the duty to the addressee arises out of the contract
between the sender and the company-and it is not material that the
addressee is suing for a breach of duty and not for a breach of contract. The action, they declare, is in the nature of a tort action, but
it is really based on the contract and limited by its terms. 6 There7
fore the addressee is bound by the stipulations just as the sender is.Y
The leading case of Ellis v. American Telegraph Co.' states the
position of these courts: "It is difficult to see how the plaintiff who
claims through a contract entered into by the sender with the defendants, which created the duty and obligation resting in the defendants,
can claim any higher or different degree of diligence than that which
was stipulated for by the parties to the contract. Certainly a derivative or incidental right cannot be greater or more extensive than that
Some courts hold that the presentment of claim in writing is a condition
precedent to the right of action; therefore, if such claim is not presented the
action cannot* be maintained even though brought within the limited time:
West. U. Tel. Co. v. Yopst, ii N. E. 16 (Ind. 1887); West. U. Tel. Co. v.
Ferguson, 27 S. W. 1048 (Tex. 1894). Other courts, however, are of the
opinion that the presenting of the claim is a condition subsequent, defeating
a right of action if no claim is presented, and that it is sufficient if suit is
begun within the limited time to satisfy the condition: West. U. Tel. Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 So. 419 (1889).
" Supra note 8.
"Findlay v. West. U. Tel. Co., 64 Fed. 459 (W. D. Va. 1894) (the addressee in claiming the benefits arising out of the contract, must also take
the obligations imposed on the sender); McGehee v. West. U. Tel. Co., 169
Ala. iog (igio) (the addressee cannot establish his relation to the company
through the contract and then repudiate some of its provisions). Van Cleave
v. West. U. Tel. Co., io7 Ky. 464, 54 S.W. 827 (1900); Penn v. West. U.
Tel. Co., 159 N. C. 3o6, 75 S. E. 16 (1912); Broom v. West. U. Tel. Co.,
71 S. C. 5o6, 51 S. E. 259 (1904) (the duty springs from the relation created by the contract; but the contract "limits, qualifies, moulds the duty" which
the law imposes upon the company); Frazier v. West. U. Tel. Co., 45 Ore.
414, 78 Pac. 33Q (1904).
' In these cases affecting the addressee, whether the stipulations are looked
upon as regulations or as terms of the contract, is not stressed. The cases
in the previous note will not allow an addressee any greater rights in an action
of tort than the sender could have in an action of contract-and this is so
whether stipulations are regulations or terms of the contract. See infra,
note 19.
13 Allen 226 at 238 (Mass. 1866).
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which attached to the principal or source whence such right accrued
or was derived." But it is difficult to see that the tort duty arises
out of the contract and is so limited by it. Rather the transaction
which created the contract, at the same time created a situation. It is
from this situation that the tort duty is defined. The sender can and
does contract away his own right. But it is difficult to see how the
sender can waive the right .of another, the addressee. And thus some
courts hold that the action is purely ex delicto and has no reference to
the contract between the sender and the company. They declare the
duty owed to the addressee is a public duty because of the public
nature of the business. They hold, therefore, that the addressee is
not bound by the stipulation, and is not precluded from recovery if
the limited time has expired.""
While it is admitted that there is a strong practical argument for
binding the addressee by the stipulation, nevertheless it is submitted
that the more logical view for allowing an addressee a right of action
against the company for the latter's errors and failure to deliver is
upon the ground that the company has breached its public duty to the
addressee. The duty then arises not out of the contract, but because
of the public nature of the company's business. It follows that when
the addressee sues in tort, he is not claiming through the contract
between the sender and the company-he is not purporting to refer to
the contract for its benefits and to repudiate what is not beneficial.
He is merely adverting to the contract to establish his relation to the
company as an addressee and not for the purpose of creating a duty
to him. The duty is owed publicly to the class of persons of which
the contract shows him to be one. Referring to the contract for that
purpose alone should not of itself make him bound by the provisions
of it. The suit being in tort, independent of the contract, he should,
therefore, not be bound by the stipulation limiting the time for the
presentment of claim.
Jesse H.
LIABILITY OF A DRAWEE BANK FOR PAYMENT OF A CHECK PAYABLE TO A NAMED PAYEE NOT CONNECTED WITH THE TRANSACTION,

WHERE SUCH FACT WAS UNKNOWN TO THE DRAWER-The drawer
of a check, relying on the representations of another, occasionally
makes it payable to a person whose existence is unknown to him, and
who, in fact, has no connection with the transaction. Such a situation arises thus: A solicits a loan from D, the drawer, for a purported
client, P. P has no connection with the transaction. D draws a
'Webbe v. West. U. Tel. Co., 169 Ill. 61o, 48 N. E. 67o (1897); West.
U. Tel. Co. v. McKibben, 114 Ind. 5H1, 14 N. E. 894 (decision rested in part
on a statutory provision allowing addressee to sue for special damages occasioned by company's negligence) ; West. U. Tel. Co. v. Markley, 144 Ia. lO5,
122 N. W. 136 (igog). Stipulations on back apply to sender and not to addressee: N. Y. Printing Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298 (186o); West U.
Tel. Co. v. Richman, 19 N. C. 569, 8 Atl. 171 (1887) ; Tobin v. West. U. Tel.
Co., 146 Pa. 375 (189 ) ; Bailey v. West. U. Tel. Co., 227 Pa. 522, 76 Atl. 736
(191o).

NOTES
check to the order of P and sends it to A. A indorses P's name on
the check, and, after negotiation, the drawee bank pays to the holder.
When D brings an action against the drawee bank for improperly
paying out his funds, a case is presented which has resulted in contrary decisions by courts of last resort called upon to adjudicate it.
In Pennsylvania the drawee bank could debit the amount paid out on
D's account, and he could not object.' In Alabama 2 and in Iowa, by
the recent case of McCornack v. Central Bank,3 the drawee bank
would be liable. Both of these cases, representing what seems to be
the present majority view, were accompanied by vigorous dissents,
citing and approving the Pennsylvania case. 4
That such a difference of judicial opinion should exist is not
surprising in view of the fact that the theory of the doctrine that a
bill payable to a fictitious or non-e-xisting payee is payable to bearer
has been questioned by eminent writers, and its application has been
a matter of uncertainty in the law since its inception in 1791. 6 The
cases at common law confined the doctrine to bills drawn payable to
one not intended to get an interest in the bill and indorsed in blank in
the named payee's name.7 But both the United States and England,
in their codification of the law of bills and notes, declared such a bill
payable to bearer at once." However, the similarity in the codifica'Marcus v. People's National Bank, 57 Pa. Super. 345 (1914).
'Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 2o2 Ala. 167 (1918).
32i1 N. W. 542 (Iowa, 1926).
4Supra
note i.
"§ 9-3 [Negotiable Instruments Law] declares an instrument
to be payable
to bearer, although it is 'payable to the order of a fictitious person.'
Such
rule ignores the tenor of the instrument; nor is there any judicial precedent ora
mercantile custom in support of the notion that a bill payable to a fictitious
payee, but not indorsed in the name of such payee, is payable to bearer." Dean
Ames in14 HAIv. L. REv. at 246 (igoo).
"There are strong arguments in favor of Professor Ames' view. Technically it is wrong to permit the transfer without indorsement of an instrument
which appears on its face to require an indorsement for a valid transfer."
MCKEEHAN, THE NEGOTIaE INSTRUMENTs LAW, 41 Am. L. REG. (N.
s.) at
446 (19o2).
'Livesey & Co. of London drew bills payable to a non-existent person on a
drawee who also had knowledge of the payee's non-existence. The House of
Lords held that a holder in due course of one of these bills could recover against
the drawee who had accepted, declaring on the bill as payable to bearer: Minet
v. Gibson, i H. BI. 568 (i79I). There had been several earlier holdings to the
same effect: Tatlock v. Harris, 3 Term. R. 174 (789) ; Vere v. Lewis, 3 Term.
R. 182 1789) ; Collis v. Emmet, i H. BI. 313 (I7go). But Minet v. Gibson is
regarded as the leading case. For further history of the doctrine see the note
to Bennett v. Farnell, i Campb. 130 (i8o7), and' KuLu, THE: FIcTiTIous PAYEE,
18 MIcH. L. REv. 296 at 301 (920).

t
Supra
note 6. But Professor McKeehan sites three New York common
law cases where title was held to have passed by mere delivery: Plets v.
son, 3 Hill 112 (1842);. Central Bank of Brooklyn v. Lang, i BosworthJohn2o3
(1857); Irving Bank v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536 (i88o).
'The English Bills of Exchange Act, § 7-3, provides, "When the payee is a
fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer."
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tions ended here, the Negotiable Instruments Law requiring knowledge on the part of the drawer that the named payee would not get
title to the bill for the bill to be payable to bearer, while the Bills of
Exchange Act made no such requirement. 9 The justification of the
rule in Section 9-3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is based upon
giving effect to the drawer's intent. If a man puts in circulation an
instrument which he knows'is drawn payable to a person who has no
connection with the transaction, "it may well be held that he intends
or should be estopped to deny that he intends that title shall pass, and
that it shall circulate without indorsement, and by mere delivery." '0
On the other hand, if he believes the payee will get the instrument, as
in the principal case, "he intends it to pass by indorsement only." 11
There is no room for contention that the check in the principal case
is payable to bearer under Section 9-3. The check is payable only
on the order of the named payee.
Before considering the results of the drawing of such a check in
its bearing on the liability of the drawee bank, the relation of the
drawer and the bank must be considered. The drawee's duty is not
founded on any mercantile custom such as usually regulates the rights
and liabilities of parties on commercial paper, but owes its origin to a
contract made by the bank with one who opens a checking account.
This contract may be expressed, but, in the absence of express provisions, it is implied by law. 2 It has been said that "The banker's
contract with his depositor is to pay the latter's checks only to the
payee or to one who claims through a genuine indorsement." 13 BeThe Negotiable Instruments Law, § 9-3, provides, "The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
9Ibid. Under § 7-3 of the Bills of Exchange Act it has been held that the
drawer's ignorance that the payee is non-existing is immaterial. Clutton v.
Attenborough, [1897] A. C. go. A later case, Macbeth v. North and South
Wales Bank, [i9o8] i K. B. 13, however distinguished "fictitious" and "nonexistent" thus: "Two different aspects are contemplated by § 7-3, the one is that
the payee is fictitious; the other that he is non-existent. Existenfce or nonexistence is a question of fact, not relevant to anybody's mind or intention.
'Fictitious' is different. A thing can only be fictitious relatively to some one.
There can be no action without an actor, and no fiction without a feigner."
And the court held a bill not payable to bearer where the drawer was ignorant
of the fiction, but the payee was, in fact, existent. Hence, though § 7-3 of the
B. E. A. is different from § 9-3 of the N. I. L., the law is the same in the case
of fictitious payees by judicial construction.
For a comment on Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank, see 28 CAN.
L. T. 542 (i9o8) and 22 L. R. A. at 5o4.
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw, (4th ed. 1926) 98.
"BRANNAN,
10c. cit. supra note IO.
32 Elliott v. Capital City State Bank, 128 Iowa 275, lO3 N. W. 777 (9o8),

Jordan-Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 74o
(19o9) ; United Security Life Insurance Co. v. Central National Bank, 185 Pa.
586, 40 Atl. 97 (i88).
'United

note 12.

Security Life Insurance Co. v. Central National Bank, supra

NOTES

ing a contract, the drawer's right of action is only dependent on his
performance of certain obligations under the same contract."4
Two reasons are advanced by those who would not hold the bank
liable for the payment of such a check on the indorsement of the
swindler. The first is the argument of the Marcus case 5 to the
effect that the drawer, by drawing a check which was "not susceptible
to genuine indorsement," nor payable to bearer under Section 9-3 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, increased the risk of the bank, and,
so, did not perform his obligations under the contract of deposit. The
court said, "A duty rests on the depositor not to subject the bank to
extraordinary risks with regard to payment of checks," and said that
making a check to a "fictitious" payee was such an act on the authority of a dictum in the case of Land, Title and Trust Co. v. Northwestern Natioial Bank.1 It is submitted that the risk of the bank is
not increased. A bank has a duty to determine the authenticity of the
payee's signature in the case of any ordinary order check. No additional burden is put upon the bank in this case. Here the named
payee had no connection with the transaction, but the writing of his
name was, nevertheless, a forgery,17 no more difficult to detect than
any other forgery.
.The other argument of those who would not hold the drawee
bank liable for its payment of the check (the one adopted by the dissent in the McCornack case 18) is based on Section 6i of the Negotiable Instrum~ents Law which provides that "The drawer by drawing
the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity
to indorse. . . ." The statutory admission imposed by this section
prevents a drawer from denying the-capacity of one to whom he has
"Trust Co. of America v. Conklin, 65 N. Y. Misc. i, 11g N. Y. Supp. 367
(Igo9); Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 7o Ati. 876

(1908).

' Supra note i.
""The rule [that a bank is liable to its depositor for payment of a check
on a forged indorsement] applies where a check has been lost or stolen and the
payee's name has afterwards been forged; but it does not protect a depositor
who is in fault, as in writing a check to one who he has reason to suppose will
make a fraudulent use of it, or in so carelessly filling up a check that it may
readily be altered, or in issming a check to a fictitious person. It is confined to
cases in which the depositor has done nothing to increase the risk of the bank."
Land, Title and Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Ad.
42o (igoo). The Land Title case was one of fraudulent impersonation, where
the drawer identified the person he intended to be payee by sight and sound,
although he inserted the name of another. In such a case many of the courts
hold that the identified person gets legal title under another's name. This is the
application of a legal principle well known in the law of sales. See Effect
of Imposition by Impersonation in the Law of' Bills and Notes, 34 HARv. L.
REV. 76 (i92o). The above language of the Land Title case was quoted by the
court in Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, supra note 14, and approved
in Marcus v. People's National Bank, supra note 12. It marks the origin of
the Pennsylvania rule.
. Hatton v. Holmes, 97 Cal. 2o8, 31 Pac. 1131 (1893); People v. Warner,
1o4 Mich. 337, 62 N. NV.405 (1895).
'Supra note 3.
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intended to give title to transfer that title, e. g., an unauthorized
corporation. 9 But it certainly should not make him admit that any
other than the named and intended 0payee could indorse the check.
Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield 2 effectively disposes of the contention that Section 61 relieves the drawee bank of the consequences
of its payment of the check. The court there said, "If Section 61
makes Brasfield (the drawer) admit the existence of the payee, Johnson, and his capacity to indorse the check, this would but strengthen
the reason and necessity of obtaining a genuine indorsement before
paying the check. The section does not make Brasfield (the drawer)
admit that any other than his named payee could properly and legally
indorse the check." In the only other case found where the relation
of Section 61 to Section 9-3 was discussed, the court arrived at the
2
same conclusion without hesitation. '
It has been suggested that giving the drawee bank an equitable
defense would place the loss on the one of the two innocent parties
making the loss possible. This maxim was used by the PennsylIts fallacy is in its assumption of the thing at issue,
vania court.2
viz., whether both parties are equally innocent, a question which it
seems must be answered in the negative on analysis of the respective
rights and duties of the parties. The drawee bank has paid an order
check on the forged indorsement of the payee, and should be liable
by its contract of deposit.
C.M. B.
STATE REGULATION OF PRICES-It is very difficult under the
cases to lay down a working rule by which readily to determine when
a business has become clothed with a public interest. In Wolff v.
Kansas Industrial Court,' it was said that the thing which gave the
public interest, justifying price regulation "was the indispensable
nature of the service and exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to
which the public might be subjected without regulation." 2

" Lowell-Woodward Hardware Co. v. Woods,

2O4

Kan. 729, i8o Pac. 734

(igig); Ingle System Co. v. Norris, 132 Tenn. 472, 178 S.

W.

1113 (1915).

_Supra note 2.
"American Hominy Co. v. Millikan National Bank, 273 Fed. 55o (S. D.
Ill., 192o).

"Supra note I at 350.
1262 U. S. 522 (1923).

'However, in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (2914),
speaking of Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (894), it was said: "A law

of the State of North Dakota was sustained which made all buildings, elevators,
and warehouses, used for the handling of grain for a profit, public warehouses
and fixed a storage rate. The case is important. It extended the principle of
the two other cases, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876), and Budd v. New
York, 143 U. S. 5r7 (2892), and denuded it of the limiting element which was
supposed to beset it-that to justify regulation of a business, the business must
have a monopolistic character."

NOTES

The most recent case involving price fixing legislation is that of
Tyson & Brother v. Barton.3 Tyson & Brother was engaged in the
business of re-selling tickets of admission to theatres and other places
of amusement in New York City. Its sales averaged approximately
3oo,ooo tickets per annum. Section 167 of Chapter 59 o , New York
Laws 1922, declares that the price of, or charge for, admission to
theatres and other amusements is a matter affected with a public interest and subject to state supervision. Section 172 forbids the resale of any ticket at a price in excess of fifty cents in advance of the
price printed on the face of such ticket. Tyson & Brother brought a
bill to restrain the enforcement of the last-named section and it was
held unconstitutional.
The exact question before the court was much narrower than the
one principally'discussed by the court. It was not whether there was
constitutional power to fix the price which theatre owners and producers may charge for admission. Although the statute declares that
the price of tickets of admission to places of amusement is affected
with a public interest, it does not purport to fix the price of admission. The statute requires only that the sale price whatever it is, be
printed on the face of the ticket and prohibits the licensed ticket
broker, an intermediary in the marketing process, from re-selling
the ticket at an advance of more than fifty cents above the printed
price.4
Yet the court's opinion does not confine itself to this question,
but principally discusses whether the theatre is a business affected
with a public interest so as to justify price regulation of the services
of the theatre owner and producer. And in the course of the opinion
it is stated that:
"If it be within the legitimate authority of government to
fix maximum charges for admission to theatres, lectures (where
perhaps the lecturer alone is concerned), baseball, football, and
other games of all degrees of interest, circuses, shows (big and
little), and every possible form of amusement, including the
lowly merry go round, with its adjunct the hurdy gurdy, it is
hard to see where the limit of power in respect to price fixing is
to be drawn."
The unnecessarily broad scope of the decision must indicate a
conservative application of the principle of the Wolff case. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold
or used is an inherent attribute of property itself I and as such,
'47 Sup. Ct. 426 (iq_7).
"In
this respect it is similar to Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (Q876),
where the attempt was not to fix the price of grain but to regulate the price of
the service charged by elevators, which stood in an intermediary position between the producer and the public.
'Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 278 (1872).
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within the protection of the due process clause, yet an invasion of
this right by a bona fide exercise of the police power does not violate
the due process clause. 6 A fortiori, it is much less an invasion of the
rights of private property to regulate the price at which an intermediary may sell such property to the public.7
The statute here was designed to protect a large class of consumers from exorbitant prices made possible by the strategic position of a group of intermediaries in the distribution of a product from
producer to consumer. Tested by the principle laid down in the
Wolff case and others from which the principle was evolved, it is
submitted that the immediate question before the court, viz., whether
the State of New York could regulate the maximum price that the
ticket broker could charge for theatre tickets should have been decided in the affirmative.
It must be admitted that the service of the ticket broker is indispensable to those consumers who wish the particular tickets over
which these brokers have control. By acquiring a virtual monopoly
on the best seats, the brokers are thus enabled to demand extortionate
prices of the theatre-goers.'
The basis for the court's decision seems to be that the service
rendered by the ticket brokers is not as necessary or essential to the
economic interests of the public, as is the service of a grain elevator,9
or stock yards,' 0 or an insurance company." But how essential the
service of the ticket broker is to the public should not make the exercise of the State's police power less reasonable. Laws against monopoly which aim at the same evil and accomplish their end by interference with private rights quite as much as the present law are not
regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable because they are not limited
in their application to dealings in the bare necessities of life. As
Justice Holmes states in his dissenting opinion, "But to many, the superfluous is the necessary and it seems to me that government does
not go beyond its sphere in attempting to make life livable for them."
A. D. M.
'Barbier v. Comolly, 113 U. S. 27 (i885); Mugler v. Kansas, I23 U. S.
627 (1887).
'Munn v. Illinois, supra note 4.
'An examination of the decisions in which price regulation has been permitted will disclose that the element common to all is the existence of a situation
or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the regulating force of
competition. Whether this situation arises from the monopoly conferred upon
public service companies, or from the circumstance that the strategical position
of a group is such as to enable it to impose its will in matters of price upon
those who sell, buy or consume, as in Munn v. Illinois, supra note 4, or from
predetermination of prices from schedules controlling constancy, as in German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 4, or from a housing, shortage growing
out of a public emergency, as in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 175 (r92i), the
result is the same.
'Munn v. Illinois, supra note 4.
'0 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 85 (i9o).
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 2.

